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Thousands of civilians from Allied and neutral countries reached Britain during the
Second World War. Nearly all who arrived between 1941 and 1945 were detained for
interrogation – an unprecedented course of action by Britain which has nevertheless
seldomly been studied. This article focuses on the administrative history of this process
and the people it affected. It demonstrates how certain parts of the state treated non-
Britons with suspicion throughout the war, long after fears of a ‘fifth column’ had sub-
sided. At the same time, others saw them favourably, not least because many either
offered intelligence, intended to volunteer with the Allied Forces, or work for the
war industry. Examining how these conflicting views co-existed within a single deten-
tion camp, this article thus illustrates the complex relationship that existed between
non-Britons and the wartime state, which perceived them simultaneously as suspects,
assets, and allies. By making use of the thousands of resulting interrogation reports,
the article also offers more detail than currently exists on the gender and nationality
background of those who reached Britain, as well as about the journeys they took to
escape occupied territory.
Chaim Wasserman, a young Jewish man from Poland, was in a detention camp
in London when the war in Europe ended. The camp authorities described him
as a student, but that had been his status six years earlier, when at the age of
eighteen he was sent to live in a ghetto in Warsaw, then to several prison
camps, then to Auschwitz, and eventually to Buchenwald, from where he
escaped in April 1945. It was then that he crossed paths with a group of liber-
ated British prisoners of war, with whom he was evacuated to England. Why
was Britain detaining a man like him? Wasserman was in fact among the
last of 34,000 civilians to have passed through that camp between 1941 and
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1945, most of them Allied nationals who had been evacuated or escaped to
Britain. Few had been concentration camp inmates –many were volunteers
for the Allied Forces, some were members of resistance groups, others were
war workers. Women and children, often coming to join their husbands and
fathers in the latter groups, were also detained. The purpose of their detention
was for the Security Service to determine whether they were enemy spies or
genuine refugees (a term used in a colloquial sense rather than to denote a
specific background).
The decision to incarcerate non-enemy civilians solely for interrogation was
taken over a year into the war. But it came on the back of policies that treated
all foreign nationals with suspicion and sought to control their presence in the
country since before war broke out.1 While tens of thousands of Germans,
Austrians, and Czechoslovaks fleeing the Nazis had escaped to Britain between
1933 and 1938, most of them Jews supported by the local Jewish community,
stances changed when responsibility for refugee support was shifted onto
the state. Compounding the situation was the fact that Germany launching
an aggressive war would cause non-Jews to flee too, as indeed happened.
The estimated numbers, together with a conviction that the presence of
more Jews would exacerbate anti-Semitism in the country, led Neville
Chamberlain’s government to abandon plans to rescue any large numbers of
people of whatever nationality once war broke out.2 Instead, only pre-selected
individuals would be granted visas based on skills shortages. Escape to Britain
during the war was thus not facilitated in any large scale and not on humani-
tarian grounds.3
People nevertheless did arrive, often clandestinely, and contributed both to
the local and the wider war effort. Belgian refugees, for example, added sub-
stantially to the British economy and forces;4 Norwegian officers worked
closely with the British on the intelligence front;5 while without the Polish
mathematicians who developed techniques against ciphers, the ‘Ultra’ opera-
tions at Bletchley Park ‘would never have existed’.6 What we often know
about these people is evidently their part in the war effort in general,
nationality-based terms.7 An exception is Wendy Webster’s transnational
1 See D. Cesarani, ‘An alien concept? The continuity of anti-alienism in British society before
1940’, Immigrants & Minorities, 11 (1992), pp. 24–52.
2 L. London, ‘British government policy and Jewish refugees 1933–45’, Patterns of Prejudice, 23
(1989), pp. 26–43.
3 Schemes were devised to allow certain nationalities into the UK, but the general policy was
against mass evacuations. See ch. 7 in L. London, Whitehall and the Jews, 1933–1948: British immigration
policy, Jewish refugees, and the Holocaust (New York, NY, 2000). Other Western European countries
also adopted similarly restrictionist policies: F. Caestecker and B. Moore, eds., Refugees from Nazi
Germany and the Liberal European states (New York, NY, 2010).
4 R. W. Allen, Churchill’s guests: Britain and the Belgian exiles during World War II (Westport, CT,
2003).
5 See P. Salmon, ed., Britain and Norway in the Second World War (London, 1995).
6 J. Ferris, ‘The road to Bletchley Park: the British experience with signals intelligence, 1892–
1945’, Intelligence and National Security, 17 (2002), pp. 53–84.
7 Nationality-based studies are of course useful in their own right and lay the groundwork for
transnational and comparative approaches. For examples, see M. Sherwood, Many struggles: West
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study of non-Britons in Britain, which drew on a range of sources to reveal a
country that was more diverse during the war than at any previous point, and
indeed more diverse than it is remembered today.8 This article uses the official
archive of the UK government to add to these efforts of documenting the his-
tory of multinational wartime Britain, and does so through focusing on the
camp in which Wasserman was detained. The camp lends itself well to trans-
national examinations both because its remit cut across nationality lines and
because life there was the one experience many arrivals shared: detention
was compulsory, and it was only after it that they were allowed to proceed
for billeting or enlistment. Put simply, the camp – based at the Royal
(Victoria) Patriotic School in Wandsworth, south London – is the only window
we have into the first contact wartime arrivals had with UK authorities, before
they became part of British society and the war effort in the ways that Webster
and others have examined.
Yet little is known about the camp’s purpose and living conditions.9 This is
largely the result of a deliberate ambiguity that surrounded this place, and
which later turned it into a blind spot for historical enquiry. Specifically,
the Royal (Victoria) Patriotic School’s (RPS) status as a detention camp was
concealed during the war, with it having been presented as a ‘reception’
camp for refugees and volunteers for the Allied Forces; it was even formally
known as the ‘London Reception Centre’, in an attempt to detract from its
detention function (hence why this article does not adopt this latter name).
Consequently, RPS has been left out of studies into British civilian internment.
With the exception of some brief mentions, it has also been left out of studies
on the refugee experience, since stays in RPS were themselves brief. Having
been treated neither as a detention nor a refugee camp, it has nevertheless
been examined as an intelligence camp: recent quantitative analysis into thou-
sands of interrogation reports produced in RPS has revealed its value both to
the three Fighting Services and several government departments.10
Important as RPS was for such purposes, its story spans beyond intelligence
history. By shifting the focus away from the information that was obtained in
this camp, this article answers three questions that are of wider significance:
why was the detention of non-enemy civilians considered necessary until
May 1945; who exactly did it affect; and how was it managed? Seen in this
Indian workers and service personnel in Britain (1939–45) (London, 1985); A. Zamoyski, The forgotten few:
the Polish Air Force in the Second World War (London, 1995); L. Sponza, Divided loyalties: Italians in Britain
during the Second World War (Bern, 2000).
8 W. Webster, Mixing it: diversity in World War Two Britain (Oxford, 2018). See also W. Webster,
‘Enemies, allies and transnational histories: Germans, Irish, and Italians in Second World War
Britain’, Twentieth Century British History, 25 (2014), pp. 63–86.
9 The main exception is Simona Tobia’s work, which discussed some of the camp’s functions
from the perspective of languages, given the number of different nationalities accommodated
there: S. Tobia, ‘Victims of war: refugees’ first contacts with the British in the Second World
War’, in H. Footitt and M. Kelly, eds., Languages and the military: alliances, occupation and peace building
(London, 2012), pp. 131–47.
10 A. J. Photiadou, ‘“Extremely valuable work”: British Intelligence and the interrogation of refu-
gees in London, 1941–45’, Intelligence and National Security, 36 (2021), pp. 17–33.
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broader light, the story of RPS concerns the nature of detention in wartime
Britain, the status of foreign civilians, as well as the state’s attitude towards
them before they came to be of any obvious use to it, such as through employ-
ment. In particular, RPS demonstrates that, despite fears of a ‘fifth column’
having subsided by the end of 1940, non-Britons were viewed with suspicion
throughout the war. This suspicion was, however, not uniform and was primar-
ily the attitude of the Security Service (MI5); departments such as the Home
and War Offices, as well as their camp staff on the ground, often saw refugees
as war victims and allies, attitudes that were reflected in RPS’s living
conditions.
This plurality of attitudes muddled RPS’s status as well as its legacy: was it a
detention, refugee, or intelligence camp? Clearly, RPS was all three. While this
was a place from which British intelligence benefited extensively, at the same
time it was a temporary home for refugees, who were nevertheless kept there
as detainees – even though they may have sometimes been unaware of this sta-
tus, as will be explained. Indeed, Jordanna Bailkin’s recent work, which has trans-
formed theway British refugee camps ought to be understood, demonstrates how
such sites resembled detention camps, even in the absence of the necessary legal
footing: ultimately, their residents were very often not free.11 The case of RPS
confirms this association, showing how an actual detention camp was passed
as an unremarkable reception centre. Seen in this way, and despite the fact
that RPS had no obvious precedent, its existence is part of a longer history of
the lines between refugee reception and detention getting blurred.
That these different functions existed under the same roof then raises the
question of how the state coped with the detention of people who shared little
in common – they arrived from dozens of different countries, using different
means, and for different reasons. In answering it, the article reveals the bur-
eaucracy that developed between MI5 and the Home, War, and Foreign
Offices allowing them to maintain this sensitive operation until May 1945.
The fact that RPS involved these various departments makes it an intrinsically
important case-study of how certain intelligence efforts relied on those of
external sections. This aspect is difficult to capture elsewhere, since few estab-
lishments commanded the constant attention of these multiple stakeholders –
camps for the detention and interrogation of prisoners of war in Britain were
primarily the domain of the War Office;12 the camp for the detention and
interrogation of spies was the domain of MI5;13 while internment camps for
civilians were the responsibility of the Home and War Offices.14 In this
sense, RPS’s story also illustrates Peter Gatrell’s argument, that refugee history
can serve as a prism through which to understand other matters, in this case
11 J. Bailkin, Unsettled: refugee camps and the making of multicultural Britain (Oxford, 2018).
12 F. Bell, ‘“One of our most valuable sources of intelligence”: British intelligence and the pris-
oner of war system in 1944’, Intelligence and National Security, 31 (2016), pp. 556–78.
13 R. W. G. Stephens and O. Hoare, eds., Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi spies: the official history of MI5’s
wartime interrogation centre (Richmond, 2000).
14 R. Pistol, Internment during the Second World War: a comparative study of Great Britain and the USA
(London, 2017).
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matters pertaining to British wartime attitudes and institutions.15 To achieve
this, and given the heavy involvement of these various departments in RPS,
the research relies on the official record. While the latter can hinder the
lived experience in places of incarceration, the involvement of intelligence
has imposed limitations on the existence of non-government sources (not
least because RPS was ‘the most difficult place to get into and out of’).16
However, the paper trail left behind is not limited to administrative minutiae
and propaganda: the interrogation reports produced form a unique source
through which to piece together the stories and background of some of
Britain’s refugees.17 The article thus uses the UK government’s own archive
to offer a first thorough examination of the camp’s administrative evolution
and purpose, highlight the stories of individuals who fled Nazi Europe, and
uncover a so-far neglected site of multinational wartime Britain.
I
The mass detention of non-enemy civilians solely for interrogation was not an
immediate resort when war broke out. During the ‘phoney war’, and in line
with action taken during the First World War, the main focus were Germans
and Austrians, and later Italians as well, who were already in Britain, some of
whom were interrogated to establish their allegiances. The ideological dimen-
sion of the conflict, however, soon revealed the fact that nationality alone
would not be enough to identify a true ‘enemy alien’, a term which technically
referred to nationals of countries with which the UK was at war. In fact,
Britons too could be interned if they were (suspected) fascists. Most foreign arri-
vals thus became of concern and differentmeasureswere put in place to dealwith
the situation. Anyonewhowas suspected of spying or having arrived illegally was
interrogated in MI5’s Camp 020, the place where the Double-Cross System was
operating, ‘turning’ Axis agents into double agents. Then there were the
‘enemy’ nationals, for whom separate internment processes were put in place;
in any case, few arrived after 1939.18 Of particular relevance here is the third cat-
egory: nationals of friendly and neutral countries who arrived in larger numbers
after May 1940. With the invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium that spring,
thousands fled to France, and Britain expected 300,000 of them to reach its
shores, even though only about a tenth of such figures managed to reach the
UK that summer. But despite being a fraction of what was expected, refugees
arrived amidst revelations of Vidkun Quisling’s involvement in the invasion of
Norway, with similar rumours spreading about other places. These develop-
ments served to exacerbate an existing fear of a British ‘fifth column’, much of
15 P. Gatrell, The making of the modern refugee (Oxford, 2013).
16 Beverton, Ronald James (Oral History), 30 May 1991, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive:
12068.
17 The author has compiled a dataset on these interrogation reports and the individuals
involved in them. Please contact the author for access.
18 See Pistol, Internment during the Second World War.
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which was expected to arrive disguised as refugees.19 All arrivals were thus vet-
ted at the ports by MI5 and those whose interrogations were unsatisfactory were
handed to the police.
Although the arrangements at the ports were quickly recognized as inad-
equate – interrogations were brief, inconsistent, and carried out by untrained
personnel – they remained in place until November 1940, when a more strin-
gent process was adopted. At that point, large-scale evacuations from
Europe were being restricted, with ships only allowed to admit those with
visas, ‘in order to stop at the source the movement of Alien refugees to this
country’.20 With few refugees expected to arrive from then on, the vetting pro-
cess became more thorough: instead of allowing those with satisfactory port
interrogations to proceed for billeting as before, they were now to be taken
to London for further interrogation.
The Royal (Victoria) Patriotic School in Wandsworth – ‘one of the gloomiest
specimens’ of Victorian Gothic21 –was selected to receive these apparent non-
suspects from December 1940 and was officially opened the following January.
Originally a boarding school for orphans of the Crimean War, turned into the
South Western General Hospital during the Great War, RPS was to be receiving
all men from friendly and neutral countries coming to the UK to work for the
war industry or volunteer with the Allied Forces – no women, no children, no
‘enemies’. The incarceration intention behind it was clear: arrivals had to ‘be
kept under physical control from the moment they set foot in this country
until such time as they were cleared by the Security Service’.22 Their status
was therefore that of persons under detention, not internment, the former
being the temporary detention of a suspect, the latter the preventative depriv-
ation of liberty on security grounds (as with ‘enemy’ nationals).23
Arrangements for women were also made. Those from friendly countries
who were not accompanied by a man were considered ‘potentially dangerous
until thoroughly vetted’ and were detained, with any children they had, in a
nearby evacuated school in Balham.24 Despite being located in a different
neighbourhood, the building – 101 Nightingale Lane –was part of the RPS
establishment. Women accompanied by a man were initially exempted from
detention. This policy ceased in February 1941, when it was decided that
those women (and their children) had to be detained too.25 Other categories
first exempted were also included at that stage, the result of a realization
within British intelligence that German espionage abilities were much less
advanced than initially thought, and so the only way an agent would attempt
19 G. Prysor, ‘The “fifth column” and the British experience of retreat, 1940’, War in History, 12
(2005), pp. 418–47.
20 ‘Aliens Advisory Committee: Minutes of the 22nd Meeting held at the Home Office on the 28th
October 1940’, HO 213/1978, The National Archives (TNA).
21 Moylan (Home Office) to David Petrie (director general, MI5), 17 Apr. 1942, KV 4/342, TNA.
22 ‘History of the London Reception Centre, 1940–45’, 2, KV 4/7, TNA.
23 Security Intelligence Centre, Conference on RPS, 3 Jan. 1941, KV 4/339, TNA.
24 Turner (MI5) to Clayton (HO), 3 Feb. 1941, KV 4/339, TNA.
25 SI 243/3, 28 Feb. 1941, KV 4/339, TNA.
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to enter was openly, disguised as a refugee.26 By early 1941, it was thus the
‘unimportant people’ who became prime suspects, such as women and
seamen.27 This meant that the only people not sent to RPS, bar occasional excep-
tions, were ‘enemy’ nationals; Allied diplomats; Britons and British subjects;
Americans; Russians; and neutral aliens (unless they wanted to work for the
war industry or enlist).28 Figure 1 shows when all others passed through RPS.
Evidently, despite the abeyance of ‘fifth column’ fears before RPS even
opened, the camp saw a constant flow of traffic until May 1945, raising the
question why. Part of the answer is that while fears of a co-ordinated group
working to undermine domestic security had subsided, there still remained
fears that individual agents would infiltrate the Allied Forces. Britain was in
a position to control this latter threat since under wartime legislation, and
in certain circumstances, Allied nationals arriving in Britain were subject to
conscription; moreover, joining the Allied Forces often required travelling to
Britain in order to do so. The nationalities behind Figure 1 support this func-
tion of a vetting camp for future recruits. The first relative spike in arrivals
occurred in mid-1941 and was driven by Norwegians, some of whom had
been brought back from various British commando raids –which they
Figure 1. Monthly RPS arrivals, January 1941–May 1945. Note: the full data behind the figure can be
found in Appendix I.
26 ‘History of the Security Service’, 195, KV 4/2, TNA.
27 ‘Most secret notes’, undated, KV 4/342, TNA.
28 Various categories were exempted at different points; see KV 4/7, KV 4/339, and FO 371/
32230, TNA.
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assisted – starting with Operation Claymore in March.29 The second wave came
in the first half of 1943 and was driven by French nationals. Operations in
North Africa in the previous months had enabled many Frenchmen abroad
to enlist, but to do so they had to be evacuated to Britain. Such were the num-
bers involved that it was eventually agreed that such volunteers would be
taken directly to Algiers, not the UK. The final, continuous period of arrivals
started in mid-1944, coinciding with preparations for the liberation of
Western Europe; it was accordingly driven by Norwegian and Dutch nationals.
Even so, until mid-1943, MI5 had a policy of collecting all arrivals in RPS,
not just prospective recruits.30 Accordingly, around 62 per cent of those who
were detained in 1941 and 1942 went on to enlist.31 At the end of 1943, officers
at the ports were asked to continue sending prospective volunteers without
exception, but only send non-volunteers if there were grounds for suspecting
them.32 This timing coincided with a broader policy of advising ‘intending
refugees…to stay where they were’, due to the changing tide of the war.33
The point when there was an attempt to restrict RPS’s remit to volunteers
was therefore also the point when non-volunteer arrivals were being restricted
even further. The evidence thus suggests that most relevant nationality cat-
egories who arrived during the war passed through RPS.
Whatever their reasons for escaping, only a fraction of these civilians had the
potential to be a threat: fewer than 300 were detained further (fewer than 1 per
cent of all), fifty of whom were subsequently confirmed as agents. One of those
was Johannes Dronkers, a Dutch clerk in the German Post Office in The Hague
until he was recruited by the Abwehr and sent to Britain on a small boat, in
order to report back on various British Army matters. His story did not convince
RPS who dispatched Dronkers toMI5’s Camp 020; hewas convicted and hanged on
the last day of 1942.34 Notably, Dronkers had been briefed by theAbwehr about RPS,
indicating that knowledge of the camp’s existencemay have deterred less thought-
through infiltration attempts and indeed, only three agents are known to have
evaded detection. Two of them were Norwegians who arrived in England for
‘whisky and Intelligence’ and fooled not only RPS but also the Norwegian Forces,
which they joined; they were arrested after an intercepted German radio message
revealed their mission.35 While it may therefore be straightforward to dismiss
RPS’s value in preventing infiltration only by looking at the small number of
29 C. Mann, ‘Combined operations, the commandos, and Norway, 1941–1944’, Journal of Military
History, 73 (2009), pp. 471–95.
30 Draft from Rawlinson (MI9) to deputy director Naval Intelligence, WO 208/3510, TNA; Kingsley
Rooker (British Mission, Clarence House) to Lord Bessborough (French Welfare, Foreign Office), 9
Nov. 1942, FO 1055/9, TNA.
31 ‘Table giving aliens landed to join Allied armed forces at London Reception Centre’, HO 215/
509, TNA.
32 Circular no. 806 to security control officers, 3 Dec. 1943, KV 4/343, TNA.
33 C. Holmes, ‘British government policy towards wartime refugees’, in M. Conway and
J. Gotovitch, eds., Europe in exile: European exile communities in Britain, 1940–1945 (New York, NY,
2001), p. 14.
34 See files KV 2/43–6, TNA.
35 Stephens and Hoare, eds., Camp 020, pp. 175–6.
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known attempts made, the task is less straightforward when considering what
tactics the Abwehr may have employed in the absence of this obstacle.
Yet for MI5, the question was not simply whether a refugee was an agent or
an ally: some fell in between. Those were people who lied about their past or
were ‘renegades of varying degree’.36 Among the last ‘undesirables’, as these
individuals were called, was a man who claimed to have been Polish but to
have grown up in Greece. His story was believed, and he was sent to the
Greek Mission in London, who duly returned him to RPS until confirmation
of his story was received from the Greek authorities. It was upon his return
to RPS that he revealed himself to be Herbert Ernst Hintz, a German farmer.
The son of a communist, Hintz declared ‘that he had always been opposed
to the Nazi Government’, he had not joined the Hitler Youth, and had deserted
in Greece in 1941.37 Although his account was considered ‘probably true’, the
fact that Hintz claimed to have mastered the Greek language only after being
shielded by locals in 1941, as well as the fact that he had initially lied about his
age, saving him from having to account for five years of his life, rendered him
‘undesirable’. Such people were not kept in RPS indefinitely – they either
became the responsibility of other MI5 sections, or were released to their
national representatives with ‘an appropriate warning’.38
That Hintz’s interrogations took place in the spring of 1945 also points
to the fact that MI5’s standards in RPS were never relaxed. If anything,
in the run up to D-Day they became even more inflexible: ‘until the military
operation had been well and thoroughly launched no chances were taken
in the way of releasing aliens against whose bona fides there remained the
slightest residual doubt’.39 Even the timing of one’s arrival was subject to
scrutiny during that time, leading to assumptions as to their ‘true’ motives
for escaping:
The quality of the arrivals, particularly Belgian and Dutch, has deterio-
rated considerably. These belated ralliers to the Allied Cause can, for
the most part, make no pretence of being impelled by patriotic motives,
and often enough they have not made the slightest attempt to resist the
enemy at home. Their motive for escaping is pure selfishness: mostly the
risk of being conscripted for work in Germany has roused them to leave
their homes. And furthermore, these attentistes have at least decided on
which side of the fence it will be most profitable to jump.40
Clearly, in RPS MI5’s remit changed. As the Allied war effort was turning on
the offensive, the focus was less on identifying enemy agents and more on
gathering counterintelligence, identifying ‘renegades’, and identifying agents
to recruit. The way MI5 were fulfilling these purposes also changed as a result,
36 ‘History of the London Reception Centre’, ch. II, KV 4/7, TNA.
37 ‘LRC monthly summary (May 1945)’, KV 4/25, TNA.
38 ‘History of the London Reception Centre’, ch. II, KV 4/7, TNA.
39 Ibid., ch. III, p. 14.
40 ‘LRC monthly summary (Feb. 1944)’, KV 4/25, TNA.
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with more elaborate record-taking and indexing practices having been
adopted: whereas in October 1941, an MI5 officer would deal with three or
four detainees daily, by February 1943 that had decreased to one detainee,
and it would now take more staff to complete an individual’s interrogation.41
The result was that after the war, RPS was praised within MI5 as having had ‘an
important effect in altering the status of the Security Service and in rendering
possible systematic intelligence work’.42
II
Non-enemy civilians were treated with suspicion by MI5 throughout the war, not
just during its first year. Butwhile suspicions remained, the actual expectation that
enemyagentswould be found inRPSwasnever great, evenwithinMI5. Despite this
awareness, the duration of detention was increasing. The average stay in January
1941 was a day,43 in November it was four days, and by August 1942 it had almost
tripled to eleven;44 it fell to between nine and ten days in March 1943.45 What
explains this paradox is the fact that non-enemy civilians held information that
was useful both for counterespionage purposes but also military and political
ones. Accordingly, together with MI5 and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6),
the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) set up a detachment in RPS in the
summer of 1941, interrogating on behalf of several other sections, from specialist
War Office and Admiralty ones to those of the BBC; the Air Ministry also attached
officers there soon after. By the autumn of 1941, RPS was already ‘very rapidly
changing its character’, with the majority of its work focusing on gathering intel-
ligence, despite prolonging detention in the process.46 For that reason,muchof the
official record around RPS is made up of interrogation reports, especially those of
the DMI detachment, which are unrelated to espionage and are instead concerned
with military and civilian matters in occupied territory. Containing information
from about 4,000 detainees, this material is particularly insightful because it con-
cerns the ‘average’ civilian rather than those who were of some security interest
due to their background, like Dronkers and Hintz. Crucially, these reports are
one of the only sources – if not the only one – through which to understand why
and how people came to Britain, as well as through which to learn more about
who they were in terms of gender and nationality.
The first key question which the reports help answer is how people reached
Britain. Approximately a quarter of the detainees in the reports were fisher-
men and seamen who had the knowledge and means to escape; they would
often bring others with them.47 Many did so on an ad hoc basis, but others
worked for the ‘Shetland Bus’ – a clandestine fleet run by MI6, the Special
Operations Executive, and Norwegian military intelligence, sending supplies
41 Memorandum by Moylan, 4 Feb. 1943, HO 215/509, TNA.
42 ‘History of the Security Service’, 195, KV 4/2, TNA.
43 Extract from B24d note, 30 Jan. 1941, KV 4/339, TNA.
44 Whittall (RPS) to B3 Division (HO), 5 Sept. 1942, HO 215/509, TNA.
45 Glasspool (RPS) to Kirk (HO), 4 Mar. 1943, HO 215/509, TNA.
46 Butler (MI5) to D. G. White (MI5), 4 Oct. 1941, KV 4/341, TNA.
47 See Figure 1 in Photiadou, ‘“Extremely valuable work”’, p. 23.
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to Norway and bringing back refugees. It was the ‘Shetland Bus’, for example,
that brought seven Norwegian men – a teacher, two commercial travellers, a
fisherman, a mechanic, a medical student, and a journalist – on board the fish-
ing boat M/K Heland M5V in February 1942.48 The average journey to Britain
nevertheless emerges from the reports as ten weeks, which means that people
often made their way to neutral territory first, and were from there either
evacuated to Britain or made the crossing using the more clandestine means
described. Far more rarely, there were crash landings, including one on the
morning of 5 July 1941 when a two-seat plane, stolen and flown by two former
pilots of the Belgian Air Force, landed on a field near Harwich.49
Escapes were not always planned. A man who found himself in England
apparently coincidentally was Hermanus Corbiére. Late in the evening of 17
June 1941, twenty-year-old Corbiére saw six fellow Dutchmen trying to escape
Holland on a small boat; after helping them launch it, he pretended to be
drowning in order to be pulled in and escape with them.50 He arrived the
next day with the party of six strangers – a carpenter, two engineers, one of
whom was on the run from the Gestapo, and a doctor with his two sons.51
Although Corbiére may have been hoping to escape and was for that reason
in the area that night, other examples of people who did not necessarily
plan to come to Britain include Norwegians brought back after British raids.
One of those was a tinsmith from Narvik who was on board the cargo vessel
Mira when it was torpedoed in March 1941; he was wounded during the raid
and brought back by the British commandos.52
A second question these reports help answer is where did these
people come from? Unlike the crude data behind Figure 1, where dozens of
nationalities were classed as ‘sundry’ by MI5, the DMI reports drew on
individuals from at least twenty-nine countries. The frequency with which
the main nationalities appear in the reports (Figure 2) is, however, similar
to the trends observed in Figure 1, with those from Western Europe dominat-
ing the reports.
Yet some nationalities stand out since they were normally exempt from the
process, the first being Britons, the majority of whom were from the Channel
Islands. One of them was a shoe shop assistant from Jersey who had been
caught by the Germans listening to the BBC in 1944. Having been sentenced
to deportation to Germany, he was being driven through north-west France
when his bus run into a US combat group, who liberated the prisoners and
shot their escorts.53 His report discussed civilian morale in Jersey, confirming
that there had been ‘very little resistance to the Germans’, and claiming that
the ‘behaviour of a great number of women has been quite disgraceful’, with
‘many illegitimate children on the island born to German fathers’. The
48 MI19(RPS)/615, 12 Mar. 1942, WO 208/3673, TNA.
49 A.B.106, 8 July 1941, WO 208/3664, TNA.
50 A.B.71, 25 June 1941, WO 208/3663, TNA.
51 See reports covering 22–5 June 1941 in WO 208/3663, TNA.
52 A.B.17, 5 June 1941, WO 208/3663, TNA.
53 MI19(RPS)/2348, 14 Aug. 1944, WO 208/3737, TNA.
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remaining fourteen pages touched on a number of other matters, from cur-
rency changes and taxation to local cinema and theatres.
But while forming the majority, not all Britons were from the Channel
Islands. One was a merchant who returned home to England after living in
Japan for some thirty-six years; in RPS he discussed that Allied broadcasts
were being jammed – the sound was like ‘running water’ – and opined that
the best time for them was after seven in the evening.54 Another Briton – an
official who left Hong Kong shortly after its surrender – discussed how the
Japanese operation ‘was well planned, perfectly executed and the
co-ordination of the services moved like clockwork’.55 The report does not
elaborate on his background, but the man appears to have been David
Mercer MacDougall, who after the war became colonial secretary of Hong
Kong and briefly its acting governor.56 It is unclear whether any Britons
were detained in RPS or were interrogated by its officers elsewhere.
A second nationality that stands out in Figure 2 is Russian, as Russians and
Americans were usually exempted from RPS too. The overwhelming majority
of Russians in the reports were previously forced labourers in Organisation
Todt and were interrogated in July 1944; among them were two children
aged twelve and fourteen, a ‘political commissar’, a peasant, railway workers,
and army officers. Several Organisation Todt labourers were interrogated
in RPS, not just the Russian nationals. In fact, in mid-1943, the Theatre
Intelligence Section of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied
Figure 2. Individuals in the reports of the DMI detachment in RPS, by nationality (N = 3,942). Note:
‘Other’ includes several nationalities, most of which appear only once in the reports.
54 MI19(RPS)/578, 7 Feb. 1942, WO 208/3673, TNA.
55 MI19(RPS)/625, 21 Mar. 1942, WO 208/3673, TNA.
56 In the report, his name is given as D. M. MacDougall; the date of birth matches that of David
Mercer MacDougall.
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Expeditionary Force, planning the invasion of Normandy, said that ‘their
knowledge of Organisation Todt in the West was largely based’ on a Belgian
stevedore’s account in RPS.57
Together with former forced labourers, RPS’s detainees included people who
had previously been in German captivity. In 1943, for example, a Polish man
brought photographs showing interned Jews in Morocco – the length of his
journey nevertheless meant that Morocco had been captured by the Allies by
the time he reached RPS.58 Two years on, a French Jew found himself in RPS
after being liberated from Auschwitz; with him was a Dutch Jew who had
been a forced labourer, and a Polish officer who had been a prisoner of war
since 1939. All were asked about their treatment by the Russians after liberation
(which they said was overall correct).59 Days later came Chaim Wasserman,
mentioned earlier and described as ‘a young and intelligent Polish Jew, who
fell into the clutches of the Gestapo’ in 1942, when he attempted to escape
to Czechoslovakia and ended up in Auschwitz.60 His report, discussing some
of the horrific things he experienced there, was complemented by the account
of a forty-nine-year-old haberdasher, also a Polish Jew. The latter described
how several inmates were burned alive by the Germans as the Russian advance
was approaching in 1945, while the rest were sent on a march; during it, he was
injured and abandoned on the side of the road. He was found by escaped British
prisoners of war who gave him a uniform and had him pretend ‘he was of
Australian origin’; he stayed with them for some three months, until they
were all liberated by US troops and sent to the UK.61
Alongside victims of Nazi persecution, RPS’s reports drew on Germans – the
third nationality that stands out, even though it is unclear whether any were
actually in RPS. Among the first was Fritz Beckhardt, interrogated in June 1941
and described as having been ‘in Goering’s squadron in the last war’.62 In real-
ity, Beckhardt was a highly decorated fighter ace in 1914–18, he had been
detained in Buchenwald in the present war because he was Jewish, and was
apparently released at Hermann Goering’s orders.63 Aside from Beckhardt
and a few deserters, the majority of Germans arrived after the summer of
1944 – due to difficulties in finding suitable accommodation to evacuate civi-
lians following Allied operations, some were sent to the UK. Among them
were also women who were interrogated in Holloway Prison, not RPS, includ-
ing the secretary of a firm working with Organisation Todt, who was deemed to
be ‘under the narcotic of many years of Nazi propaganda’.64 She was followed
by the ‘rather attractive’ wife of an officer twenty years her senior; although
57 MI19(RPS)/1740, ‘Monthly analysis of reports’, WO 208/3720, TNA.
58 MI19(RPS)/1305a, 23 Feb. 1943, WO 208/3697, TNA.
59 MI19(RPS)/2616(s), 27 Apr. 1945, WO 208/3747, TNA.
60 MI19(RPS)/2635, 11 May 1945, WO 208/3747, TNA.
61 MI19(RPS)/2636, 15 May 1945, WO 208/3747, TNA.
62 A.B.42, 14 June 1941, WO 208/3663, TNA.
63 L. S. Beckhardt, Der Jude mit dem Hakenkreuz: Meine deutsche Familie (Berlin, 2014).
64 MI19(RPS)/2240, 29 June 1944, WO 208/3732, TNA.
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she was thought to be anti-Nazi, she was ‘unfortunately of the pampered wife
type, not over intelligent’.65
Remarks such as the above, together with the small number of reports con-
cerning women, point towards the fact that less importance was placed on the
value of women as intelligence sources, even though some of the information
was followed up. For example, a French woman, previously a driver for the Red
Cross, reached England via Spain and gave information that led to a building in
France being put under Allied watch as a potential German parachutist
school.66 Moreover, while approximately 1 per cent of the reports were by
women, the overall number of women who reached Britain during the war
may have been much smaller than that of men (unlike before 1939, when
the majority of refugees were women and children).67 Although regular statis-
tics have not been located, between January and June 1942, Nightingale Lane
had 403 detainees, 141 of them children.68 Those same six months saw around
3,300 men stay in RPS – eight times Nightingale Lane’s traffic. The majority of
the women and children during that period were Norwegian (53 per cent),
most of whom had been evacuated to Britain following raids. Then there
were Belgian women and their children (11 per cent), most of whom were
wives of volunteers or workers; the same went for Polish detainees (9 per
cent). As for the French (also 9 per cent), half were wives of serving members
or volunteers, while the rest were themselves volunteers for the Women’s
Auxiliary Service or the war industry.
The smaller number of Nightingale Lane detainees has affected the volume
of material available for that camp. Much of it concerns train sets, toy trucks,
bath toys, and dolls: one of the main expenditures for Nightingale Lane was on
toys, since the children would often break them or refuse to leave them
behind. But toys were not one of the areas that the Home Office wished to
save money over: ‘it would be hard hearted to deprive the kiddies of any
small toys, to which they had become attached, when the time came for
them to be moved on’.69 Discussions over Nightingale Lane actually reveal
another way in which refugees were seen, particularly by camp staff: as victims
of war. As soon as it was announced that Nightingale Lane would start accom-
modating German women in 1945, its deputy commandant handed in her res-
ignation, because she felt ‘it would be quite impossible for her to combine the
two jobs of looking after friendly aliens and enemy aliens’.70 (She was forced to
withdraw it for there was no one to replace her.) Similar attitudes existed
among staff in the men’s camp. The first commandant of RPS, for instance,
expressed concern about ‘destitute’ non-volunteers who were being paid
65 MI19(RPS)/2358, 17 Aug. 1944, WO 208/3737, TNA.
66 MI9(a)/RPS/212, 20 Aug. 1941, WO 208/3667, TNA.
67 H. Jones, ‘National, community and personal priorities: British women’s responses to refugees
from the Nazis, from the mid-1930s to early 1940s’, Women’s History Review, 21 (2012), pp. 121–51.
68 ‘Return of alien women and children R.L.L. [refused leave to land] and sent to Nightingale
Lane Centre, period 1st January–30th June 1942’, HO 215/505, TNA.
69 Pinder (HO) to Bluett (HO), 7 July 1942, HO 215/486, TNA.
70 Baxter (MI5) to Butler, 4 Jan. 1945, KV 4/343, TNA.
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some money to help around the camp. He wrote that, for the most time, ‘they
are condemned to inactivity…In this state they become lazy or crazy, or
both.’71 He reported this to the Home Office in the hope that there would be
‘funds available for helping such cases’. Soon after, the Home Office started
providing them with ‘pocket money’.72 Such attitudes by camp staff appear
to have been appreciated by some of the prisoners: according to one anecdote,
upon release, a Frenchman handed the guard some money and asked for it to
be given to the Red Cross ‘as a token of appreciation for the kindness extended
to him’ while in RPS.73
Yet here again attitudes were not universal. When in 1942 the DMI and the
Directorate of Naval Intelligence suggested that a more ‘cheerful’ atmosphere
be adopted in the camp, given that to them detainees were valuable assets,
MI5’s director general emphasized that the use of RPS for intelligence-
gathering was ‘in the nature of a gift’ and that the primary reason the camp
existed was to ensure ‘that no enemy agents or dangerous suspects shall
enter the country undetected’. More tellingly, he asserted that these were
‘refugees from an intolerable state of affairs in their own country – violence,
concentration camps, starvation’, whereas in RPS they were ‘safe, reasonably
well-housed and fed’.74 In other words, by offering conditions that were better
than what they had left behind, RPS was good enough since, in MI5’s eyes, refu-
gees were suspects until proven otherwise.
III
While there were incentives to maintain RPS until the end of the war, there
were also incentives not to alienate Britain’s Allies –whose nationals made
up the majority of detainees – in the process. These aims were reconciled
through diplomacy, regulation, and propaganda, and through the efforts of
the Home and Foreign Offices, whose involvement ensured that life in RPS con-
trasted sharply to that in camps across Europe, most obviously in occupied ter-
ritory. It is due to them that RPS, despite being a detention camp, looked like a
reception centre.
Administratively, RPS was always under the Aliens Department of the Home
Office: on paper, it was the latter’s immigration officers who could order a per-
son’s dispatch from the port to RPS, and it was again immigration officers who
could order one’s release from the camp. In reality, however, they were follow-
ing the direction of MI5 in every step of the process. For the avoidance of
doubt, explicit instructions to that effect were issued in March 1941.75 The
War Office was also involved by providing administrative staff and guards,
and also appointed RPS’s first commandant (the one who asked for funds
71 Churchill Longman (RPS) to Colonel W. R. D. Robertson (military liaison officer, Home Office),
21 Feb. 1941, KV 4/339, TNA.
72 Robertson to Moylan, 25 July 1941, WO 215/505, TNA.
73 Glasspool to Kirk, 14 Apr. 1945, HO 215/488, TNA.
74 Petrie to DMI, 4 Apr. 1942, KV 4/342, TNA.
75 SI 784/2/4, 21 Mar. 1941, KV 4/340, TNA.
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for ‘destitute’ cases).76 The Home Office’s involvement in RPS was nevertheless
not altogether nominal: they intervened on a number of occasions to ensure
that living conditions were satisfactory. One of their first interventions
occurred as early as January 1941, when they realized that MI5 was keeping
very few records, causing people to be forgotten in the camp for days.77 To
avoid such cases becoming the norm, the Home Office suggested that a daily
list of arrivals was kept so that the duration of detention could be monitored.
Soon after, all documents produced during a person’s stay were kept on file,
and similarly thorough records were kept for personal property, to avoid
any complaints of theft inadvertently attracting attention.
Another significant intervention came in the form of a sub-committee of
the Home Defence (Security) Executive, the latter having been established in
May 1940 to deal with ‘the dangers of the “Fifth Column”’.78 Its RPS sub-
committee was set up soon after RPS opened in 1941 and after Lord
Swinton, chair of the Executive, expressed concern over the planned detention
of Norwegians brought back from the Lofoten raid.79 After all, those men had
fought alongside the British and yet they were about to be put behind barbed
wire. It was then that the suggestion was made to transform RPS into ‘a really
presentable Volunteer Transit Centre’, helping to ‘disguise as much as possible
[RPS’s] nature as a place of detention’, rather than restrict its remit.80 What
was also decided at that point was RPS’s formal name – it became the
‘London Reception Centre’.81
In pursuit of this change in atmosphere, the sub-committee was assisted by
several parts of British culture. The British Council supplied the camp with
works by Brontë, Kingsley, Dickens, Austen, Kipling, and Yeats, despite most
arrivals not being able to read English; a smaller selection of foreign literature
was later made available.82 The British Film Institute loaned RPS a projector, so
that detainees would watch Popeye, Jessie Matthews movies, and Ministry of
Information propaganda.83 Portraits of the royal family and Churchill were
put up on the walls,84 playing cards and dartboards were made available,
and table tennis sets and footballs were purchased from Selfridges.85 A
piano was also bought from Harrods in 1942, with the first recital given by a
76 ‘Security Intelligence Centre, Conference on the Royal Patriotic School, Wandsworth’, 3 Jan.
1941, KV 4/339, TNA.
77 Clayton to Renton, 30 Jan. 1941, KV 4/339, TNA.
78 War Cabinet Paper (40) 172, ‘(HD(S)E): memorandum by the lord president of the Council’, 27
May 1940, PREM 3/418/1, TNA.
79 White to Abbott (MI5), 17 Mar. 1941, KV 4/339, TNA.
80 Ibid.
81 HD(S)E/61, ‘Control of entry, Royal Victoria Patriotic School: note by the Security Service’, 22
Mar. 1941, KV 4/339, TNA. See also draft letter from White to Armstrong, 17 Mar. 1941, KV 4/339,
TNA.
82 See HO 215/485, TNA.
83 HD(S)E, Committee on Royal Patriotic School, minutes, 8 May 1941, KV 4/340, TNA.
84 ‘Report on interview with Major Churchill Longman on 15th April 1941’ by Steel (British
Council), HO 215/485, TNA.
85 ‘Reception Centre – RVPS, statement of Treasury Grant-in-Aid Account at 30th September
1941’, HO 215/485, TNA.
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British captain and a female Russian pianist.86 (On most other nights, it was the
refugees who played their national anthems on a second, out-of-tune piano,
much to the annoyance of staff whose room was next door.87) To oversee
day-to-day life in the camp, a welfare officer was also employed, tasked with
making a refugee’s ‘sojourn as pleasant as possible, both physically and men-
tally’.88 The resulting activities included dancing and croquet, ‘cinema shows,
concerts, billiards…and of course, various literary activities’.89 What proved
more difficult was removing the barbed wire from around the camp, as the
War Office was unwilling to double RPS’s guard to thirty to fill the gap that
this would create. But the benefit of not attracting attention – ‘if one wishes
to avoid the impression that the Patriotic School is a detention camp, then
it is essential that the outward and visible signs of restriction should be as
unobtrusive as possible’90 – outweighed the risk of escapes, and so it was
removed regardless. Much less determination for improvement concerned
the building of an air raid shelter, which never materialized. Despite the
issue having been discussed by the sub-committee, and despite RPS having
been set up during the Blitz, building a shelter proved impractical.
Aside from redecoration, diplomacy with Britain’s Allies was crucial in keep-
ing RPS intact, as well as in keeping with the overall good inter-Allied relations
that were maintained in the country, despite occasional conflicts.91 Not every-
one co-operated immediately; in the early months, the Free French made a
number of demands, such as that officers be segregated from civilians, that
the French be segregated from other nationalities, and that white
Frenchmen be segregated from black Frenchmen.92 While it does not appear
that those requests were met, it was agreed that a welcome letter from
General de Gaulle would be distributed to French arrivals,93 while British
representatives of the Free French were among the first to visit the camp in
1941.94 Even so, in his memoirs de Gaulle insisted that RPS was there to recruit
Frenchmen for ‘the British Secret Services’.95 It is unclear how accurate this
accusation was because although MI6 were recruiting in RPS, they had been
asked by MI5 not to tempt those who wanted to join the Free French.96
On the whole, however, and especially after the sub-committee instructed
the Foreign Office to write to the various Missions in 1941, calling for their
co-operation over RPS, few problems arose. Ministers of the Norwegian,
Dutch, and Yugoslav governments-in-exile were invited to visit RPS and
86 Kirk to Bluett, 20 June 1942, HO 215/487, TNA.
87 Glasspool to Kirk, 18 Aug. 1942, HO 215/510, TNA.
88 ‘History of the London Reception Centre’, ch. II, KV 4/7, TNA.
89 Kirk to Sir Norman Kendal (New Scotland Yard), 22 Apr. 1943, HO 215/509, TNA.
90 HD(S)E/61, 22 Mar. 1941, KV 4/339, TNA.
91 See ch. 4 in Webster, Mixing it.
92 Younger (MI5) to Major Archdale (Spears Mission), 16 Apr. 1941, KV 4/340, TNA; ‘Note pour la
Mission Spears’ by General Petit, 27 Feb. 1941, KV 4/320, TNA.
93 HD(S)E: Committee on Royal Patriotic School, minutes, 5 June 1941, KV 4/340, TNA.
94 The earl of Bessborough to Younger, 7 July 1941, FO 1055/9, TNA.
95 C. de Gaulle, War memoirs: the call to honour, 1940–1942 (London, 1955), p. 157.
96 White to Secretariat, 2 Apr. 1941, KV 4/340, TNA.
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expressed satisfaction with the premises;97 whenever large parties arrived at
once, a representative of their government was also allowed to welcome
them in person, a gesture that both ‘appeased’ the Allies and gave legitimacy
to the process – after the Dutch sent a welfare officer to welcome one such
party, MI5 told the Home Office that ‘frankly, we would have welcomed the
attendance of a more distinguished representative who could have…made
our task easier by explaining the necessity for a detention’.98 Although
there were some complaints along the way – both from detainees and their
representatives –most concerned the duration of stays rather than any other
aspect of the process; some of the complaints also stemmed from an Allied
desire to be more involved in RPS from an intelligence perspective (a desire
MI5 objected to).99
As important as inter-Allied relations were in their own right, there were
more reasons why RPS could not look like a detention camp. One problem
that the Foreign and Home Offices were trying to avoid was substantiating
German propaganda. Anything less than good treatment would have given cre-
dence to enemy claims, namely that prospective volunteers ‘are put in
Concentration Camps’, discouraging future recruits; arrangements had to
thus ‘allow of generous and friendly treatment that would not be accorded
to suspects’.100 Accordingly, those arriving as volunteers were being trans-
ported to RPS in buses and cabs rather than police vans, while the officers
escorting them had to be in plain clothes and introduce themselves as
‘guides’.101 The Home Office also emphasized the good attitude that ought to
be adopted when it came to French volunteers in particular, as they ‘have
taken an extremely difficult decision in coming to this country and have
done so at great personal risk – a risk greater in their case than in that of
other Allied nationals, who come to this country with the approval and sup-
port of their recognised Governments’.102 It would, in fact, not be unreasonable
to suggest that some of these arrivals never knew of their status, and indeed
two former detainees who discussed RPS after the war appear to have
described it not as a detention camp, but as a vetting centre for Allied
recruits.103
Domestic awareness of RPS was also a concern. Parliament was frequently
asking questions about the funds made available for various security opera-
tions, and questions about the camp would have been likely, had its true
97 Moylan to Petrie, 17 Apr. 1942, KV 4/342, TNA.
98 Butler to Lee (HO), 23 Aug. 1942, FO 371/32231, TNA.
99 See examples in FO 371/32231, TNA; see also ‘Report on the RVPS, January–June 1942’,
undated and unsigned, KV 4/342, TNA; and N. Atkin, The forgotten French: exiles in the British Isles,
1940–44 (Manchester, 2003), p. 47.
100 ‘Arrangements regarding sending individuals to the Royal Patriotic Schools’, 15 Sept. 1941,
HO 213/1981, TNA.
101 HD(S)E: Committee on Royal Patriotic School, minutes, 9 Sept. 1941, HO 213/1980, TNA.
102 Newsam (HO) to the chief constable, 5 June 1941, HO 213/1981, TNA.
103 See J. Barchilon and A. E. Duggan, ‘An interview with Jacques Barchilon: from Free French
soldier to fairy-tale pioneer’, Marvels & Tales, 25 (2011), pp. 207–20; Imperial War Museum Sound
Archive 20358 and 23218, as cited in Tobia, ‘Victims of war’.
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purpose been revealed. This meant that although the commandant was
answerable to the Home Office, he was initially put onto MI5’s payroll, expli-
citly to avoid parliamentary scrutiny of his salary and hence of his role; the
same arrangement existed for the welfare officer.104 Public opinion was simi-
larly a concern.105 British attitudes were at a turning point by the time RPS was
set up in the winter of 1940/1, because incidents like the sinking of the SS
Arandora Star, carrying ‘enemy’ civilians being deported to Canada, had created
uneasiness regarding mass internment. As a result, the internment of ‘enemy
aliens’ that was supported in early 1940 was regretted soon after and partially
reversed. If RPS policy was not to be reversed in a similar way, public opinion
had to remain dormant.
It is for all these reasons that RPS could not look like a place of detention.
Still, despite the various improvements, the camp was not perfect – the welfare
officer himself suffered a nervous breakdown due to the workload. Fights also
broke out occasionally, and so the Home Office wanted to make a room avail-
able for ‘boxing and wrestling’, to prevent detainees from partaking in such
action ‘whenever convenient in the Dining Hall’.106 The commandant also com-
plained to the Home Office in the autumn of 1942 that the duration of deten-
tion was having an impact on morale: ‘guests arrive in this country full of zeal
for the British, but after a time resentment sets in and increases in proportion
to the length of stay’; even worse, he wrote that some had ‘developed suicidal
tendencies owing to the length of their stay’.107 What exacerbated the situation
was that, in many cases, stays in RPS were on top of stays in ‘overflow’ centres.
When RPS was requisitioned, at a time when refugee policy was being
restricted, its capacity for 350 people made it ‘a little too large for the pur-
pose’.108 However, the growing use of RPS by intelligence meant that it was
often overcrowded. To accommodate those awaiting interrogation when RPS
was full, the Camberwell Institute, with capacity for 600 people, was requisi-
tioned in 1941. Such were the numbers involved that other premises were
needed for when even the overflow centre was overflowing. But welfare
arrangements in Camberwell –which started being used almost continuously
in the winter of 1942 –were inexistent.109 There were no pianos and no cro-
quet, and so people spent their days in bed; due to air strikes, the windows
were bricked up, making the place dark and poorly ventilated; the cleaners
104 ‘Security Executive Conference on Royal Patriotic School, 8th (Special) Meeting’, 16 Oct. 1941,
KV 4/341, TNA; Creedy to Moylan, 20 Nov. 1941, HO 215/509, TNA.
105 This held true when it came to public opinion and the internment of ‘enemy’ nationals:
L. Burletson, ‘The state, internment and public criticism in the Second World War’, Immigrants &
Minorities, 11 (1992), pp. 102–24.
106 Greenwood (HO) to Rosenfield (Ministry of Works), 8 Mar. 1943, HO 215/487, TNA.
107 Whittall to B3, 5 Sept. 1942, HO 215/509, TNA. The Home Office’s John Moylan later wrote
that no such suicidal cases existed in RPS but that there had been ‘some cause for alarm’ in
Nightingale Lane; he nevertheless did not elaborate further: memorandum by Moylan, 4 Feb.
1943, HO 215/509, TNA.
108 Unknown to Wells (Security Intelligence Centre), 11 Dec. 1940, KV 4/339, TNA.
109 Kirk (HO) to Bluett and Moylan (HO), 20 May 1943, HO 215/506, TNA.
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also threatened to go on strike over the ‘misuse’ of the lavatories.110 The con-
ditions were demoralizing, especially for prospective volunteers; it took this
realization on the impact of Camberwell on morale, a complaint by the
Belgian ambassador to the same effect, and an intervention by Herbert
Morrison, the home secretary, to bring about the use of a more suitable over-
flow building in mid-1943.111 Amidst those developments, and again at
Morrison’s orders, the Home Office transferred the commandant and the wel-
fare officer onto its payroll, clarifying in this way the line of responsibility
between it and MI5, halfway through operations.112 Subsequent overflow cen-
tres were considered satisfactory and few problems arose concerning the pro-
cess until it ceased completely in the summer of 1945: port officers began
sending new arrivals back to their own countries after May, overflow centres
were gradually restored to their original functions (usually schools), and RPS
was returned to the Ministry of Works.
IV
With the exception of overflow centres in 1942/3, the aim of providing a com-
fortable experience for non-enemy civilians was achieved, most of the time.
Why these people were detained in the first place was the first question this
article set out to answer. The existence of RPS was a product of the 1940
‘spy fever’; but the picture within it became more complex. Primarily seen
as suspects by MI5, as intelligence sources by the War Office and the users
of its reports, as well as nationals of Britain’s Allies by the Home and
Foreign Offices, RPS was a microcosm of a complicated and sometimes contra-
dictory relationship between non-Britons and the state, with the former sim-
ultaneously seen as a threat, as an asset, and as allies.
Who these people were was the second question posed. Those RPS held
came from a range of backgrounds – there had been weeks when twenty-eight
nationalities were there at once, each with different languages, habits, diets,
and class backgrounds.113 Nonetheless, this diverse population had one thing
in common: they were not working for the enemy. Many of RPS’s ‘guests’
and ‘informants’ were Allied men eligible for enlistment, many of whom had
travelled to Britain precisely with that aim; a smaller proportion were
women and children again of Allied nationality, as well as men from neutral
countries. The interrogation reports detailing their stories are invaluable,
not just for the purpose of tracing RPS’s history but because they appear to
be the most detailed source that exists on this population: these people
were not seen as immigrants by the authorities, and hence there was no effort
to register their arrival, let alone to record any more detail about what they
had experienced. In contrast, the reports that the Directorate of Military
Intelligence produced, although concerning only a proportion of the detainees,
110 Memorandum by Kirk, 14 May 1943, HO 215/506, TNA.
111 Herbert Morrison to Lord Portal, 22 July 1943, HO 215/506, TNA.
112 Moylan to Creedy, 16 Feb. 1943, HO 215/509, TNA.
113 ‘Report on the RVPS, January–June 1942’, unsigned and undated, KV 4/342, TNA.
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offer both demographic information and, in many cases, detail individuals’
wartime experiences.
What allowed RPS to operate unobstructed until the end of the war – the
final question posed –was the development of a bureaucracy between its sta-
keholders, which enabled Britain to take advantage of this source of informa-
tion without being criticized for doing so through detaining them, often for
weeks. The Home Office improved the administration of the camp, keeping
Allied complaints to a minimum; it often did so with the assistance of the
Foreign Office. For its part, MI5 understood diplomatic concerns and accommo-
dated them, often by footing the bill and often with the assistance of the War
Office which provided guards and administrative staff. The fact that this multi-
purpose camp was in London must also be emphasized, especially given that an
air raid shelter appears not to have been constructed. The legacy of RPS as a
detention, intelligence, and refugee camp would have been very different had
hundreds of Allied civilians been killed while being detained for information –
dozens of bombs landed in Wandsworth Common during the Blitz and more
exploded near where Nightingale Lane was; both areas were targeted again
in 1944. In the fortunate absence of such developments, a combination of regu-
lation, diplomacy, and propaganda turned RPS into a forgettable ‘London
Reception Centre’, and a forgotten site of multinational wartime Britain.
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Appendix 1: Monthly RPS arrivals, January 1941–May 1945
Month FR BEL POL NL NOR DK ‘Sundry’ Unknown Total
Jan. 41 116 7 1 1 30 0 0 5 160
Feb. 41 103 20 45 1 43 3 5 59 279
Mar. 41 120 16 7 21 205 0 13 13 395
Apr. 41 119 14 30 7 155 14 3 44 386
May 41 89 31 116 14 210 8 86 84 638
June 41 86 24 23 18 140 2 5 77 375
July 41 119 41 61 10 89 4 9 267 600
Aug. 41 120 30 25 5 314 1 3 246 744
Sept. 41 109 3 32 30 718 4 5 152 1,053
Oct. 41 94 20 52 32 732 6 6 215 1,157
Nov. 41 121 28 42 29 295 19 120 654
Dec. 41 128 26 80 36 155 2 81 508
Jan. 42 135 127 263 32 411 16 168 1,152
Feb. 42 95 27 54 43 136 5 70 430
Mar. 42 68 110 55 25 141 13 90 502
Apr. 42 145 106 113 111 135 19 111 740
May 42 113 111 50 45 154 9 96 578
June 42 108 53 66 37 84 14 107 469
July 42 87 97 126 50 23 8 67 458
Aug. 42 96 143 199 24 38 3 95 598
Sept. 42 57 59 126 29 105 75 101 552
Oct. 42 98 31 158 59 114 6 103 569
Nov. 42 67 36 79 26 68 12 82 370
Dec. 42 128 79 105 43 83 17 76 531
Jan. 43 119 79 89 20 97 5 84 493
Feb. 43 126 106 175 16 115 17 98 653
Mar. 43 278 37 299 31 221 9 87 962
Apr. 43 226 129 231 36 150 19 68 859
May 43 234 180 176 36 66 23 45 760
June 43 470 179 208 54 38 2 93 1,044
July 43 295 174 246 42 11 5 61 834
(Continued )
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Appendix 1: (Continued.)
Month FR BEL POL NL NOR DK ‘Sundry’ Unknown Total
Aug. 43 283 271 343 36 38 11 113 1,095
Sept. 43 153 59 160 20 25 36 67 520
Oct. 43 86 46 128 36 11 10 54 371
Nov. 43 119 137 167 60 13 8 73 577
Dec. 43 140 149 204 18 53 20 55 639
Jan. 44 95 71 66 30 41 8 56 367
Feb. 44 108 66 99 51 53 15 69 461
Mar. 44 147 90 117 98 89 17 64 622
Apr. 44 118 51 82 118 112 23 29 533
May 44 47 14 29 93 140 8 28 359
June 44 202 16 13 4 93 7 28 363
July 44 116 14 75 17 60 18 470 770
Aug. 44 246 109 69 124 89 15 301 953
Sept. 44 118 22 51 80 266 19 66 622
Oct. 44 163 73 113 154 231 23 48 805
Nov. 44 61 102 116 177 160 17 167 800
Dec. 44 51 43 117 171 172 1 21 576
Jan. 45 38 18 75 195 409 0 45 780
Feb. 45 28 9 100 325 243 3 21 729
Mar. 45 104 6 107 257 379 10 62 925
Apr. 45 140 12 70 137 454 11 37 861
May 45 43 68 66 36 406 137 98 854
Totals 6,875 3,569 5,699 3,200 8,813 757 4,010 1,162 34,085
The data is replicated from KV 4/7, TNA. The latter file notes that its data for Jan. –Oct. 1941 does not include
1,162 ‘non-escapees’. The monthly distribution of those 1,162 is given above in the ‘Unknown’ category and has
been estimated from information given in HO 213/468, HO 215/509, WO 208/3510, and WO 208/3475, TNA.
Their nationalities remain unknown.
Cite this article: Photiadou AJ (2021). The Detention of Non-Enemy Civilians Escaping to Britain
during the Second World War. The Historical Journal 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0018246X2100008X
The Historical Journal 23
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X2100008X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 146.199.118.203, on 28 May 2021 at 16:54:17, subject to the Cambridge Core
